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AIDS CAPS, CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE,
AND THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES'
APPLICABILITY TO HEALTH INSURANCE
Sharona Hoffman*

INTRODUCTION

Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company offered its customers
insurance policies that limited lifetime benefits for AIDS or AIDSrelated conditions ("ARC") to either $25,000 or $100,000, while
other conditions were covered up to $1 million over a lifetime. 1
When this discrepancy was challenged by two of its insured as
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")/ Mutual
of Omaha conceded that AIDS was a disability under the ADA, a
federal law that prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.3 The defendant also acknowledged that the AIDS
coverage caps were not justified as "consistent with sound
actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience,
bona fide risk classification, or state law."4 Although the insurer
offered no justification for its discriminatory reimbursement
limitation, the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Tuled
that the AIDS cap was not unlawful and could continue to be
utilized by the defendant. 5
The Doe decision is typical of opinions issued by many courts
that have evaluated and upheld allegedly discriminatory health
insurance policies challenged under the ADA. Health insurers
typically deny coverage for speech therapy, eyeglasses, hearing
*Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
LL.M. in Health Law, University of Houston; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Wellesley
College. I wish to thank Wilbur Leatherberry, Max Mehlinan, Andrew Morriss, and
Spencer Neth for their valuable comments regarding earlier drafts of this Article and Lisa
Durkee for her dedicated research assistance.
1 See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
2 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
3 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 558-59.
4 Id.
5 See id. at 557.
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aids, most foot care, and treatment for infertility. 6 Many insurance
providers exclude or severely limit coverage for treatment of
mental impairment, dental problems,7 AIDS, diabetes mellitus,
severe obesity, epilepsy, and alcoholism or drug abuse. 8 Insurance
restrictions have generated significant litigation, but have rarely
been proscribed by the courts. 9 While some Americans enjoy full
coverage for all their health needs, others who have insurance and
suffer from serious or even life-threatening conditions, such as
AIDS, must incur the expense of costly treatment or forego it if it
is unaffordable.
Allegations of discriminatory insurance coverage are brought
not only under the ADA, but also under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), which prohibits employment
discrimination based on gender and other protected
classifications. 10 In September of 2000, for example, Jennifer
Erickson filed a class action alleging that her employer's
prescription drug plan unlawfully discriminated against female
employees because it excluded coverage for prescription

6 See BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE § 6A.11[1] (2000). Not all of the conditions related to these treatments
constitute disabilities. See infra Part I.B.l.
7 See Samuel A. Marcosson, Who Is "Us" and Who Is "Them"-Common Threads
and the Discriminatory Cut-off of Health Care Benefits for AIDS Under ERISA and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 361, 416 (1994).
8 Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N (JAMA) 2503, 2504 (1992).
9 See, e.g., McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 20~ F.3d 179, 186-89 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that
health insurance plans containing caps for AIDS treatment do not violate the ADA); Ford
v. Schering-Plough Corp, 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999)
(finding that a disparity in an employer's insurance benefits for treatment of mental and
physical conditions does not violate the ADA); Bythway v. Principal Health Care of Del.
Inc., No. Civ. 97-435-GMS, 1999 WL 33220042 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 1999) (holding that a
health insurance provision that limited or denied coverage to Hodgkin's disease patients
for bone marrow transplants, while allowing it for those suffering from aplastic ariemia or
acute leukemia, is not unlawfully discriminatory under the ADA); but see Boots v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp.2d 211, 215-20 (D.N.H. 1999) (holding that a
disability plan's limitations on coverage for mental disabilities are potentially
discriminatory under the ADA).
10
See 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). The provision reads:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin;
Id. Unlilce the ADA, Title VII applies only to employment discrimination and not to
discrimination in other contexts such as insurance. Compare id., and 42 U.S.C. §§1210112213. Thus, benefits that are provided by employers are regulated by the statute, but
those purchased directly from an insurance provider are not governed by Title VII. See id.

2002]

DISCRIMINATION & HEALTH INSURANCE

1317

contraceptives while covering other preventive prescriptions.n On
June 12, 2001, a federal district court in the state of Washington
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, finding that the
employer-provided benefit plan violated Title VII as amended by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"). 12 The court
reasoned that classifying employees based on their childbearing
capacity, regardless of whether they are pregnant, constitutes sexbased discriminationY Furthermore, when an employer's benefit
plan excludes from coverage only a few specific drugs and devices,
the employer must ensure that "it provides equally comprehensive
coverage for both sexes." 14 Nevertheless, while Jennifer Erickson
prevailed in her Title VII claim of discriminatory health insurance
benefits, many plaintiffs do not enjoy similar success. 15
This Article will analyze the ADA, Title VII, and other
federal anti-discrimination laws and examine the extent to which
they govern the terms of health insurance policies. 16 It focuses on
exclusions or limitations of coverage in health insurance policies,
such as AIDS caps or refusal to reimburse for particular forms of
treatment. The Article does not address instances in which a plan
administrator denies coverage in an individual case because she
determines that a particular procedure was not medically
necessary or was experimental.
This Article provides a detailed analysis of the language of the
ADA, Title VII, and other statutes, as they apply to health
insurance. It also critiques the courts' interpretations of the
11

Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
!d. at 1276-77. The PDA provides in relevant part:
The tenns "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not linited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. ...
42 U.S. C. § 2000e(k).
13
See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
14
!d. at 1272.
15
See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) (excluding
coverage for fertility treatments is not violative of Title VII); Sales v. Covey, 117 F. Supp.
2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (failing to cover infertility treatments does not violate Title VII);
Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (denying coverage for high-dose
c?emothenipy with autologous bone marrow transplant to treat breast cancer found not to
VIolate Title VII) .
16
. .
!his Article focuses on health insurance because it has generated extensive
1
~t gatwn, administrative agency guidance, and academic debate. However, the statutory
mterpretation and many of the concepts developed in this Article can be extended to
apply to other fonns of insurance and employee benefits. Several of the judicial opinions
?Iscussed in the following sections will in fact focus on benefits other than health
msurance, such as disability and pension plans.
12
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statutory language in the areas of disability and gender
disc1imination. This Article argues that in the arena of health
insurance, the statutory scheme that purports to protect
individuals against disability, gender, and age discrimination is
characterized by significant gaps and loopholes. Consequently,
while the statutes prohibit some discriminatory insurance
practices, their reach is confined, and their effectiveness is limited.
Part I analyzes the ADA at length. The ADA is the first
federal anti-discrimination statute to address health insurance in a
separate provision, 17 and this provision has generated significant
litigation and academic debate. Part II discusses several other
federal statutes that regulate health insurance. The Article
concludes with a discussion of various means by which the
statutory gap could be remedied in order to enhance protection for
health insurance beneficiaries.
I.

THE

ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE

Analysis of the application of the ADA to health insurance
involves attention to a complex series of questions. First, can the
ADA be applied to health insurance practices in light of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 18 which establishes that a federal statute
cannot interfere with a state's insurance laws unless the federal
statute was specifically enacted to regulate the insurance business?
Second, what types of insurance limitations and exclusions are to
be deemed disability-based distinctions, governed by the ADA?
Third, two separate sections of the ADA are at issue: Title I,
which governs employer conduct, 19 and Title III, which governs the
conduct of those who own, lease, or operate "a place of public
accommodation. " 20 Who is covered by each of the two Titles?
Does Title III apply to the terms of insurance plans?
Fourth, what is the meaning of the ADA's "safe-harbor
17

See Americans with Disabilities Act§ 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
15 u.s.c. § 1012(b) (1994).
t9 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
20 !d. § 12182(a). Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity." !d. § 12132. Since health insurance companies are not
public entities, Title II does not regulate their operations. Furthermore, a public entity
that offers employees health insurance as a benefit, can be sued under Title I, which
governs employment discrimination. See id. § 12112(a). Title II is therefore inapplicable
to health insurance controversies. See Weyer v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d
1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
18
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provision," section SOl( c) of the statute,Z1 which creates a defense
for insurance providers? Which if any benefit exclusions or
limitations are prohibited by the statute? To what extent should
insurers have to justify their risk classification practices22 when
challenged under the ADA? Each of these questions will be
discussed below.
A.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act

The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[n]o Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the
The McCarran-Ferguson Act is
business of insurance."23
understood to protect not only the validity of state laws, but also
states' administrative regimes, and thus it may
limit the
applicability of a federal law even when a state legislature has not
specifically enacted a relevant insurance statute. 24 Most states
have insurance boards, commissioners, or other officials that are
statutorily empowered to regulate the insurance business within
the state in order to safeguard the public interest, establish
uniform rates, and enforce insurance laws. 25 States generally,
therefore, have an extensive system of insurance regulation.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
McCarran-Ferguson Act narrowly. In Humana v. Forsyth,Z 6 the
Court explained that "[w]hen federal law does not directly conflict
with state regulation, and when application of the federal law
would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a
State's administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not preclude its application. "27 The Act was designed to protect
state regulation from inadvertent federal interference such as
might occur if a federal law targets a general activity of which
insurance happens to be one component. 28 Furthermore, the
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
The practice of classifying risks is the "[c]ategorization on the basis of established
criteria for rating risks, establishing premiums and tabulating statistical experience."
RICHARD V. RUPP, RUPP'S INSURANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT GLOSSARY 76 (1991).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
24 See Hurnana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999).
25 See LEER. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D§ 2:7 (1997).
26 525 u.s. 299 (1999).
27 I d. at 310.
28 See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996).
21
22
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Supreme Court has instructed that the phrase "relates to the
business of insurance" is to be interpreted broadly in the
preemption context. 29 The federal statute at issue need not be
predominantly about insurance, but rather, need only make
"specific detailed references to the insurance industry." 3° For
example, the case of Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson/ 1
involved a federal statute that established that certain national
banks could sell insurance in small towns, while a Florida law
precluded such sales. 32 The Court found that the federal statute
specifically related to insurance and therefore preempted the state
law pursuant to the McCarren Ferguson Act_33
The question of whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act
precludes application of the ADA to ~surance practices has
generated a split in the circuits. The Third and Seventh Circuits
have ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars plaintiffs' claims
regarding allegedly discriminatory health insurance provisions, 34
while the Second Circuit has held that application of the ADA to
insurance underwriting is not barred by the McCarran-Ferguson
AcU5 The logic of the Second Circuit is far more persuasive than
that of its counterparts and should be adopted by future courts
deciding the issue.
In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 36 the Third Circuit
concluded that the ADA does not "specifically relate[] to the
business of insurance" because the term "insurance" does not
appear in the statute's introductory section entitled "Findings and
Purposes. "37 The court did not elaborate upon its reasoning and
provided no further discussion of the question. In Doe v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins. Co. ,38 the Seventh Circuit ruled that the ADA can
be construed as preventing insurance companies from refusing to
insure disabled individuals. 39 However, according to the court, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes an interpretation of the ADA
that would broaden its scope to govern rate and coverage issues. 40
29

Id. at 38.
Id. at41.
31 517 u.s. 25 (1996).
32 See id. at 28-29.
33 See id. at 41.
34 See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563-65 (7th Cir. 1999); Ford v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611-12 (3d Cir. 1998).
35 See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33-35 (2d Cir. 1999).
36 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
37 I d. at 611-12.
38 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
39 See id. at 564.
40 See id.
30
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The court explained that states regulate insurance
comprehensively and therefore should not be subject to federal
intervention.
By contrast, in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. ,41 the Second
Circuit held that the ADA "specifically relate[ s] to the business of
insurance," and therefore the states are not protected from its
intrusion into the realm of insurance underwriting. 42 Providing an
extensive explanation of its decision, the court noted that Title III
of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination with respect to the
goods and services of a place of public accommodation,43
specifically defines "public accommodation" as including
insurance offices. 44 Moreover, section 501(c), which applies to
both Title I and Title III of the ADA, is devoted entirely to
insurance and discusses the applicability of the statute to insurance
practices. 45 In fact, the Pallozzi court hypothesizes that Section
501(c) was written specifically to address the McCarran-Ferguson
Act and to remove any doubt regarding the applicability of the
ADA to insurance industry practices, even though these practices
are regulated by the states. 46
The plain language of section 501(c) provides compelling
evidence that the ADA extends to risk classification practices. 47
The text allows insurers to underwrite risks, classify risks, or
administer risks so long as the insurers' decisions are not
inconsistent with state law and are not used as a subterfuge to
evade the purpose of the ADA. 48 The statute thus appears to
instruct courts to scrutinize risk classification practices to ensure
that they are consistent with state law and do not constitute a
"subterfuge." Moreover, if an insurance provider limits or
excludes coverage in a manner that cannot be considered to be
"underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering risks," 49 it
will not be immune from liability for unlawful discrimination. 50
198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999).
!d. at 33-34.
43 See 42 U.S. C. § 12182(a) (1994).
44 !d. § 12181(7)(F).
45 !d. § 1220l(c). See infra Part J.D. for the text of the provision.
46 Pallozi, 198 F.3d at 35.
47 See id. at 34-35.
48 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
49 !d.
50 It should also be noted that the ADA will rarely conflict directly with an insurance
law enacted by a state. The states have not enacted laws that specifically allow coverage
exclusions or limitations that might be challenged under the ADA Consequently, the
states do not negate the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate by affirmatively allowing
certain forms of discrimination. Rather, when state laws address particular medical
conditions, they mandate coverage for those ailments and thus provide patients with
41
42
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In light of the text of Title III, section 501(c), and relevant
Supreme Court precedent, the conclusions of the Third and
Seventh Circuits must be rejected. The reasoning of the Pallozzi
court, on the other hand, is insightful and convincing. Because the
ADA specifically relates to the business of insurance, it must be
read to regulate insurance classification and underw1iting
practices, even though insurance is extensively regulated by the
states.
B.
1.

Disability-Based Distinctions

The Statutory Definition of "Disability"

While the ADA applies to the business of insurance, its reach
is limited. The ADA prohibits only discrimination that is based on
disability and does not govern conduct that disadvantages
individuals who have medical conditions that are not sufficiently
severe to constitute disabilities. The statute defines the term
"disability" as follows:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of ... [an] individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 51

An insurance provision that excludes or limits coverage for
treatment of a medical condition that does not "substantially limit"
a "major life activity" 52 cannot be successfully challenged under
the ADA. Examples would be speech therapy for a slight speech
impediment or psychological therapy for a temporary feeling of
sadness.
The ADA's statement of "Findings and Purposes" 53 begins by

protection against discrimination. See HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 6, at § 13.06[4].
Thus, arguably, the McCarran-Ferguson Act will generally be inapplicable to ADA
challenges because the ADA does not explicitly conflict with state laws. However, one
might argue that if a state has been silent with respect to a particular insurance term, such
as an AIDS coverage cap, it meant to allow its implementation. Therefore, arguably, the
prohibition of the practice under the ADA interferes with the state's regulatory scheme,
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act must be considered.
51 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2).
52 The term "major life activity" is not defined in the statute. However, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations define it as "functions
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learrting, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2000).
53 42 u.s.c. § 12101.
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asserting that forty-three million Americans have one or more
disabilities and that the number is increasing as our population
ages. 54 The statute therefore contemplates that a significant
percentage of Americans will be covered by the ADA. The
courts, however, have not been generous to plaintiffs in their
interpretation of the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate.
2.

The Supreme Court's Interpretation

The Supreme Court has construed the scope of the term
"disability" to be quite narrow. The Court has stated that the
text's language requires that "a person be presently-not
potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to
demonstrate a disability." 55
Consequently, a degenerative
condition such as multiple sclerosis is only a disability once it
actually substantially limits a major life activity. The Court has
also emphasized that in order to have a disability, "an individual
must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to
most people's daily lives."56 Furthermore, in Sutton v. United Air
Lines,57 the Supreme Court ruled that an individual whose physical
or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other
treatments does not have a "disability" and is not entitled to ADA
protection. 58 A person with diabetes or epilepsy whose symptoms
are effectively controlled by drug therapy, therefore, will not be
considered disabled according to the Supreme Court.
The problem of limited health insurance coverage raises an
interesting question in light of the Sutton case. In some instances,
an individual might have a condition, such as profound hearing
loss, that is potentially correctable, but the patient cannot afford
the corrective measure because her insurance policy does not
provide reimbursement for it. 59 The Supreme Court did not
address the issue of whether a person who does not have access to
54

!d. § 12101(a)(1).
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
56
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 693 (2002).
57 527 u.s. 471 (1999).
58 See id. at 482-83. The case involved severely myopic airplane pilots who were
denied employment by United Airlines and subsequently challenged United's minimum
vision requirement. The Court ruled that they were not "disabled" under the ADA
because their vision was corrected with eyeglasses, and thus they were not entitled to
statutory protections. See id. at 488.
59
Hearing aids are often not covered by insurance policies. See HARNETT &
LESNICK, supra note 6, § 6A.l1[1].
55
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corrective measures for financial reasons can be considered
disabled even though effective treatment is available and could
potentially mitigate the condition. 6° Coverage exclusions for
hearing aids, for example, pose a difficult problem under the
Sutton precedent. Do they constitute a disability-based distinction
because they prevent severely hearing-impaired individuals from
obtaining needed corrective devices or are they not susceptible to
challenge under the ADA because hearing impairment is a
condition that can be mitigated by use of hearing aids and thus is
not a disability? 61 The courts will likely have to grapple with this
question in the future.
3.

Disparate Impact Analysis

The anti-discrimination laws generally proscribe practices that
are facially neutral but have a disparate impact on members of a
particular protected class or classes. 62 Thus, Title I of the ADA
provides that employers may not utilize "standards, criteria, or
methods of administration . . . that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of disability. " 63 Similarly, Title III
prohibits individuals and entities from utilizing standards or
mechanisms "that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of
disability. "64 In the context of insurance coverage, however,
disparate impact analysis cannot be utilized. 65
In Alexander v. Choate, 66 the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to the State of Tennessee's decision to reduce from 20 to
14 the number of annual inpatient hospital days for which the
state's Medicaid program would reimburse hospitals. 67 The
60 See Christine Tomko, Economically Disadvantaged and the ADA: Why Economic
Need Should Factor into the Mitigating Measures Disability Analysis, 52 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2002).
61 See id. (arguing that individuals who cannot afford mitigating measures should be
considered to be individuals with disabilities despite the availability of medication or
devices that would alleviate their conditions).
62 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-36 (1971) (finding that facially
neutral educational and testing requirements that were not reasonable measures of job
performance and had a disparate impact on the hiring of African Americans violated Title
VII).
63 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (1994).
64 !d. § 12182(b)(1)(D)(i).
65 See Bonnie Tucker, Health Care and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Access to
Health Care for Individuals with Hearing lmpainnents, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1101, 1150-51
(2000).
66 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
67 See id. at 289. The case was brought under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
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plaintiffs argued that this reduction was unlawful because it had a
disproportionate effect on individuals with disabilities and because
any limitation on the number of inpatient hospital days
disproportionately disadvantages the disabled. 68 The Supreme
Court disagreed and ruled against the plaintiffs. It reasoned that
the fourteen day limitation will provide both those with disabilities
and those without them with identical hospital services. 69 The
Court stated that "the reduction, neutral on its face, does not
distinguish between those whose coverage will be reduced and
those whose coverage will not on the basis of any test, judgment,
or trait that the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting
or less likely of having. "70
The ADA's legislative history confirms that the Alexander v.
Choate decision is applicable to the ADA. The House Labor
Committee report explains:
[A]s is stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Alexander v.
Choate ... employee benefit plans should not be found to be in
violation of this legislation under impact analysis simply
because they do not address the special needs of every person
with a disability, e.g., additional sick leave or medical
coverage. 71

Likewise, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
("EEOC") guidelines provide that health-related distinctions are
not disability-based if they are broad distinctions that apply to a
variety of dissimilar conditions and affect both persons with
disabilities and those without them. 72 Accordingly, an exclusion or
limitation that has an adverse impact on people with a particular
disability but also affects people without a disability is not
governed by the ADA. The guidelines, therefore, do not support
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by
any program receiving Federal funds and thus applies to Medicaid. See id. Cases
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act are applicable to the ADA, a much newer statute for
which a more limited body of interpretive case law exists. The Rehabilitation Act itself
states that "[t]he standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards
applied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990." ld. § 791(g)
(citation omitted).
68 Choate, 469 U.S. at 290.
69 See id. at 302.
70 See id. One scholar notes that Alexander v. Choate may be distinguished from cases
brought under the ADA because unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act does not
contain an explicit provision prohibiting practices that have a disparate impact on people
with disabilities. See Chai R. Feldblum, The Employment Sector, in IMPLEMENTING THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 142 n.102 (Jane West ed. 1996).
71
HR. REP. No. 485 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420.
72 Section 3: Employee Benefits, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 265, 627:0001, at
627:0022 (Oct. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Employee Benefits].
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the use of disparate impact analysis in the health rnsurance
context.
Public policy considerations also militate against utilization of
the disparate impact theory to challenge health insurance plans
under the ADA. If the theory were applicable, essentially all
benefits, exclusions, or limitations would be vulnerable to
challenge under the ADA since individuals with disabilities are
likely to need more medical care than others and to be more
disadvantaged by any reimbursement restrictions. For example,
limitations on life-time benefits, on coverage for eye care or
elective surgery, or on the number of blood transfusions or x-rays
for which reimbursement can be obtained, may all have a greater
impact on individuals with particular disabilities than on others. 73
If disparate impact analysis were applicable to the ADA,
insurers who fear repeated court challenges might be reluctant to
implement many of the benefit restrictions that have traditionally
been used as cost-containment measures. 74 Premiums would then
rise, rendering health insurance unaffordable for an increasing
number of individuals. 75 In the alternative, requiring insurers to
tailor their reimbursement restrictions so that they do not
adversely impact individuals with disabilities to a greater extent
than others would impose a very heavy burden on the industry.
Insurers would have to determine on a case-by-case basis which
disabilities were adversely affected by each benefit term, which
claimants actually had those disabilities, and what amount of
additional coverage would eliminate the disparate impact for those

73 See id. at 627:0022-0023: see also EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to
Health Insurance, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 265, N:2303-2304 (Oct. 3, 2000)
[hereinafter EEOC Interim Guidance].
74 When challenged in court, insurers can always defend their benefits terms pursuant
to Section 501(c). However, insurers might be concerned that they will be unable to
provide sufficient proof of an actuarial or cost-based justification to overcome ADA
challenges from sympathetic plaintiffs. See discussion infra Part I.D.
75 Another concern is adverse selection. Adverse selection refers to a potential shift in
the health insurance customer population. If insurers raise premium prices too high, those
who perceive themselves as being low-risk will consider the product's price to be higher
than its value and will therefore buy little if any health insurance coverage. Those who
believe they are high-risk will purchase extensive coverage, unless premium prices rise to
the point that it is cheaper for consumers to pay for the full cost of health care out of
pocket. If all individuals who have insurance coverage incur high medical costs because of
health problems, insurance prices will rise higher and higher, creating a "death spiral" of
premiums and leading ever-decreasing numbers of healthy people to buy insurance. As
prices continue to rise even high-risk individuals will become unable to afford insurance
coverage. Ultimately, adverse selection could destabilize or even bankrupt the insurance
industry. See John Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C DAVIS L. REv. 311, 38788 (1997).
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entitled to ADA protection. 76 Even if this were possible, it would
significantly raise administrative costs that would then be passed
on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
4.

AIDS Caps and Disparities in Coverage for Treatment
of Mental and Physical Conditions

The two insurance practices that have generated litigation
most frequently are coverage caps for the treatment of AIDS 77 and
disparities in coverage for treatment of mental and physical
ailments. 78 As discussed below, while the first constitutes a
disability-based distinction, the second does not.
In Bragdon v. Abbott/ 9 the Supreme Court determined that a
woman with asymptomatic human immunodeficiency virus
("HIV") was an individual with a disability because the condition
substantiallylimited her ability to reproduce, which is a major life
activity. 80 The Court declined to decide the question of whether
HIV infection always constituted a per se disability, as defined by
the ADA. 81 Thus, it did not indicate whether an individual who
does not wish to reproduce or is unable to do so for reasons other
76 See H.R. REP. No. 485 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420 (stating that
employee benefits plans do not violate the ADA under disparate impact analysis when
they do not satisfy the special needs of persons with disabilities by providing them with
additional medical coverage).
77 See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999)
(challenging the cap of medical insurance benefits for the treatment of AIDS and AIDSrelated conditions); Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996)
(alleging that a health insurance plan's cap for AIDS-related treatment violated the
ADA).
78 See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corporation, 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998)
(challenging the disparity between disability insurance benefits for mental disabilities and
disability insurance benefits for physical disabilities); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Products,
117 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Mass. 2000) (challenging the termination of mental disability
coverage under a disability benefit plan); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th
Cir. 1997) (alleging that a long-term disability plan that provided longer benefits for
employees who suffered from physical illness than for those. who suffered from mental
illness violated the ADA); Whaley v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (D. Neb. 2000)
(challenging the validity of a disability insurance policy that limited payments for
disabilities relating to nervous or mental disorders); Bril v. Dean Witter, Discover & Co.,
986 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (alleging that a long-term disability plan unlawfully
discriminated against the plaintiff by differentiating between psychiatric and physical
illnesses). Many of the cases that analyze the ADA's applicability to insurance benefits
involve disability insurance rather than health insurance. Disability insurance features the
same kinds of limitations and exclusions that are found in health insurance and therefore
analysis relating to one type of insurance can be extended to the other.
79 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
80 See id. at 641.
81 See id. at 642.
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than IDV would be entitled to statutory protection.
The Court noted that under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, 82 guidelines and opinions issued by
administrative agencies regarding the definition of "disability" are
entitled to deference. 83 Both the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and the EEOC have issued statements finding that IDV infection
is a disability. 84 The Court also noted that once HIV has
developed into AIDS, many very serious conditions such as
pneumocystis carninii, pneumonia, Kaposi's sarcoma, and nonIn addition, many
Hodgkins lymphoma often appear. 85
uncomfortable conditions that affect HIV patients, such as fever,
weight loss, fatigue, lesions, nausea, and diarrhea, worsen. 86 A
clear inference can be drawn from the Court's statements that
even if HIV is not a disability in all cases, AIDS is. Consequently,
a limitation of coverage for AIDS treatment that is lower than
limitations for other treatments constitutes a disability-based
distinction that is vulnerable to challenge under the ADA. 87
Unlil<:e AIDS caps, unequal coverage for physical and mental
conditions is not a disability-based distinction that is governed by
the ADA. "Mental conditions" include a broad array of ailments,
some of which might be disabilities, such as major depression or
multiple personality disorder, and many of which are not, such as
low self esteem, temporary grief, and anxiety arising from marital
problems. 88 Because limitations on reimbursement for treatment
of mental conditions do not affect only disabilities, they cannot be
said to be disability-based distinctions. 89
The conclusion that the ADA was not designed to prohibit
insurance providers from offering beneficiaries less coverage for
mental conditions than for physical conditions is bolstered by the
fact that Congress passed the Mental Health Parity Act
("MHPA") 90 in 1996, six years after the passage of the ADA. The
81

467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a discussion of the Chevron principle see infra note 147.
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642.
84 See id. at 642-47.
85 See id. at 636.
86 See id.
87 The EEOC, in its guidance, uses the example of an AIDS cap as an illustration of a
disability-based distinction. EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health
Insurance, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 176, N:2301, at N:2304 (June 8, 1993). See
also, World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (stating that "it is
clear that, as an individual with AIDS, [the] defendant is disabled under the ADA").
88 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0023.
89 See id. (concluding that "such distinctions in health insurance plans thus will not
generally violate the ADA"). See also discussion of disparate impact analysis, supra Part
I.B.3.
90 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
83
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legislation required that certain group health plans that provide
both physical and mental health care benefits apply the same
aggregate lifetime limits to both. 91 Had Congress believed that the
ADA already prohibited such coverage disparities, it is unlikely
that it would have passed the subsequent law. 92 Moreover, the
MHPA fell far short of mandating complete parity between
benefits for mental health care and benefits for physical health
care. The law did not apply to employers with fewer than fifty
employees93 or to those who would experience a cost increase of
one percent or more as a result of enhancing mental health care
coverage. 94 The statute also had a sunset provision that rendered it
inapplicable to "benefits for services furnished on or after
September 30, 2001," and thus it expired five years after its
enactment. 95 It is umeasonable to construe the ADA as requiring
absolute parity in light of the fact that Congress later passed a less
restrictive statute without explicitly stating that it meant to revise
the ADA standard.
The relatively narrow definition of "disability-based
distinction" significantly limits the applicability of the ADA's antidiscrimination mandate to health insurance. This is particularly
true in light of the Supreme Court's mandate that mitigating
measures be considered in determining whether an individual has
a "disability,"a requirement that precludes many serious
conditions from being deemed disabilities. Furthermore, benefit
exclusions or limitations that affect both people with disabilities
and those without disabilities are not disability-based distinctions.
Because the ADA prohibits only disability discrimination and not
other types of discrimination, the question of whether a
discriminatory insurance term is a disability-based distinction is
the threshold question in any ADA inquiry. If the benefits term is
ld. .
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A M.A.TIER OF INTERPRETATION 16-17 (1997). Scalia states:
Another accepted rule of construction is that ambiguities in a newly enacted
statute are to be resolved in such fashion as to make the statute, not only
internally consistent, but also compatible with previously enacted laws. We
simply assume, for purposes of our search for 'intent,' that the enacting
legislature was aware of all those other laws.
ld. at 16. Justice Scalia disagrees with this approach, believing that it is based on "fiction."
He argues that it is unrealistic to assume that legislatures debating a particular bill are
intimately familiar with all arguably relevant prior legislation. See id. at 16-17. In this
case, however, it would be umeasonable to think that the authors of the MHPA, which
directly addresses disability discrimination, were ignorant of the ADA, a very wellpublicized and often cited law that was passed only six years earlier, in 1990.
93 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-5(c)(1), 300gg-91(e)(4).
94 Jd. § 300gg-5(c)(2).
95 Id. § 300gg-5(f).
91
92
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not a disability-based distinction, it cannot be challenged under the
statute and no further inquiry need be made.
C.
1.

Title I and Title III of the ADA
Title I and Insurance Policies

Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment
and thus forbids employers from discriminating against individuals
with disabilities with respect to health insurance benefits. 96
Likewise, an employer may not engage in a contractual or other
relationship that has the effect of subjecting qualified applicants or
employees with disabilities to discrimination. 97 Consequently, an
employer may not contract with a third-party insurer to provide its
employees with health insurance that is unlawfully discriminatory.
This prohibition is significant because approximately sixty-five
percent of Americans under the age of sixty-five receive health
insurance benefits through employers. 98 Sixty percent of all small
firms offered their employees health insurance benefits in 1999,
and virtually all employers with 200 or more employees offer
health benefits. 99
An employer who offers its employees health insurance
benefits cannot refuse to provide insurance benefits to a person
with a disability even if the cost of insuring such an individual will
be high. 100 However, if an insurance plan offered by an employer
contains a disability-based distinction, that plan will not
automatically violate the ADA, and its legality will be evaluated in
light of section 501(c) and other defenses, discussed below. 101

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
42 u.s.c. § 12112(b)(2).
See Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:
Analysis of the March I999 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 2000, at 1,
96
97
98

4.
99
See THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND
EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 1999 ANNUAL SURVEY 25
(1999),
100 Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 780 (E. D. Tex 1996)
(stating that "complete denial [of health insurance benefits] is a per se violation of the
ADA's mandate that employers provide individuals with disabilities equal access to group
health insurance").
101 See EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 73. See also discussion infra Part I. D.
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Title III and Insurance Policies

Title III of the ADA reads in relevant part: "[n]o individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation. " 102 A "place of public
accommodation" is defined by the ADA as including an insurance
office. 103 A plain reading of the language of this provision reveals
that it prohibits discrimination not only with respect to physical
access to insurance offices, but also with respect to the goods
offered by insurance offices, i.e., insurance policies. The scope of
this anti-discrimination prohibition, however, has been vigorously
debated in the courts.
First, the courts that have addressed the issue agree that if an
individual receives health insurance benefits through her
employer, she cannot both sue her employer under Title I and sue
the insurance company or administrator of the plan under Title III
of the ADA. 104 The courts reason that if an employee obtains
insurance through her employer, she has not acquired the benefits
from a place of public accommodation and has no direct nexus to
the insurance office. 105 In the words of one court, "a benefit plan
provided by an employer is not a good offered by a place of public
accommodation. As is evident by § 12187(7) [sic], a public
accommodation is a physical place .... " 106 Consequently, according
to the courts, an individual receiving employer-provided health
benefits can sue only her employer under Title I and cannot utilize
Title III of the ADA.
The reasoning of the courts, however, is unsound. The text of
Title III does not limit its applicability only to cases in which the
plaintiff obtained goods or services directly from the place of
public accommodation. Rather, it prohibits those who own, lease,
or operate places of public accommodations, including insurance
offices, from subjecting individuals with disabilities to
102

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
104
See, e.g., Leonard v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the
issue but deciding the case on other grounds); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d
601, 612-613 (3rd Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011-12 (6th
Cir. 1997); Lenox v. Healthwise of Kentucky, Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998);
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-1115 (9th Cir. 2000).
105
See cases listed supra note 104.
106
Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
103
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discrimination with respect to their goods or services. There is no
reason why the existence of an intermediary, such as an employer,
through whom the plaintiff obtains the merchandise, should render
Title III inapplicable. Surely, if a store owner refused to sell his
products to the administrators of a rehabilitation center for the
disabled because he did not want individuals with disabilities to
enjoy his goods, the residents would be able to sue the store owner
even though they did not directly attempt to purchase the goods.
Likewise, individuals with disabilities who are offered unlawfully
discriminatory health insurance through their employers should be
able to sue the insurance company that provided the
discriminatory policy .107
A second issue with which the courts have grappled is the
scope of Title III's anti-discrimination prohibition. The courts
agree that Title III bars insurance companies from refusing to sell
insurance policies to persons with disabilities because of their
disabilities and consequently requires them to ensure that
individuals with disabilities have access to their services. 108
However, the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have
held that the ADA does not govern the contents of insurance
policies and thus that the courts have no authority to scrutinize
benefit exclusions and limitations such as AIDS caps. 109 The
107 Because Title I is enforced by the EEOC, and Title III is enforced by the DOJ, each
agency has issued guidelines regarding the respective Title under its jurisdiction, and
neither has addressed the interrelationship between the two. See Employee Benefits, supra
note 72; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000). Consequently, no
administrative agency guidance exists concerning an individual's right to sue under both
Titles.
108 Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance, 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Parker, 121
F.3d at 1012 ("Title III regulates the availability of the goods and services the place of
public accommodation offers"); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F3d. 179, 186 (5th Cir. 2000)
("Title III prohibits the owner, operator, lessee, or lessor from denying the disabled access
to, or interfering with their enjoyment of, the goods and services of a place of public
accommodation"); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A]n
entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by the statute to provide disabled persons
with physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by
reason of discrimination against their disability").
109 Doe, 179 F.3d at 562 (stating that the ADA "regulates only access and not content");
Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115 ("[A]n insurance office must be physically accessible to the
disabled but need not provide insurance that treats the disabled equally with the nondisabled"); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 ("Title III does not govern the content of a long-term
disability policy offered by an employer"); Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 ("So long as every
employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee's contemporary or future
disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers different
coverage for various disabilities"); McNeil, 205 F.3d at 185 ("Title III does not. .. regulate
the content of goods and services that are offered").
Some district courts have found to the contrary. See, e.g., World Ins. Co. v. Branch,
966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (noting that the ADA "requires that underwriting
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conclusion of the courts that have interpreted the ADA so
narrowly is unfounded. To analyze the decisions, however, one
must tum to Section 501 (c) of the statute.

D.

The Meaning of Section 501 (c)

Section 501(c) of the ADA states the following:
[T]his Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health
maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that
administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that
regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of [the Act). 110
Most courts that have interpreted this provision perceive it as an
almost complete defense for insurers. 111
The courts correctly note that the ADA does not require that
insurers provide equal benefits for different disabilities.m As
stated above, however, the courts have carried this principle too
and classification of risks be based on sound actuarial principles or be related to actual or
reasonably anticipated experience"); Clouter v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp.
299, 304 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("[I]nsurers retain their § 501(c) exemption so long as their
underwriting decisions are in accord with either (a) sound actuarial principles, or (b)
actual or reasonably anticipated experience"); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 982 F. Supp.
1158, 1169 ("[T]he Aetna plan's distinction between physical and mental disabilities may
survive scrutiny under the ADA only if it is based on actuarial principles or other
competent factual information"); Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,432 (D.
N.H. 1996) ("[W]hile insurers retain the ability to follow practices consistent with
insurance risk classification accepted under state law, these methods must still be based on
sound actuarial principles or related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience").
no 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
111 See e.g., Doe, 179 F.3d at 562 ("[S]ection 501(c) is obviously intended for the benefit
of insurance companies rather than plaintiffs.").
112
Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116; Ford, 145 F.3d at 608; Wilson, 117
F. Supp. 2d at 95.
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far and have in most cases concluded that "the content of the
goods or services offered by a place of public accommodation is
not regulated. " 113 Thus, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 114 the
defendant conceded that its AIDS cap was not based on any
actuarial principle or economic experience, and yet the court
found that the AIDS cap was lawful and consistent with the
ADA's anti-discrimination mandate. The courts have explicitly
ruled that the "subterfuge" language of section 501(c) does not
require insurers to justify their benefit terms when they are
challenged by plaintiffsY5 Courts have also protested that they
"are not equipped to become the watchdog of the insurance
business"ttfi by engaging in analysis of actuarial datam and assert
that intrusion by the courts could lead to a destabilizing "seismic
shift in the insurance business." tts By contrast, I argue that section
501(c) imposes an obligation on insurers to provide a cost-based
justification for discriminatory benefit limitations or exclusions
and provides a defense only for those who can do so.
1.

The Plain Text of Section SOl( c)

To say that section 501( c) imposes no restrictions upon the
benefit terms that can be implemented by insurers and that it
leaves them free of the obligation to justify challenged exclusions
and limitations is to ignore the provision's plain language. If the
ADA intended to prohibit only an insurer's refusal to deal with
disabled individuals, it would have stated so explicitly. Section
501(c) could have simply directed that insurance providers cannot
refuse to provide insurance policies to individuals with disabilities
because of their disabilities.
Instead, the statute discusses the permissible activities of
underw1iting risks, classifying risks, and administering risks, and
the impermissible conduct of implementing terms that are contrary
to state law or are used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of
the ADA.tt 9 It is therefore ludicrous to conclude that the statute
does not instruct the courts to scrutinize insurers' policy terms to
m Doe, 179 F.3d at 560. See also cases listed supra note 109.
179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
ll 5 See Ford, 145 F.3d at 612; Whaley v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (D. Neb.
2000); Bythway v. Principal Health Care of Del. Inc., 1999 WL 33220042 at*3.
tt6 Ford, 145 F.3d at 612.
tl 7 See Bythway, 1999 WL 33220042, at *3.
ns Ford, 145 F.3d at 612. See also Bythway, 1999 WL 33220042, at *3.
ll9 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
ll 4
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verify that they are based on permissible practices and do not
contain impermissible components.
Moreover, the statute
generally prohibits disability discrimination with respect to
insurance 120 but qualifies this prohibition by providing an exception
for the traditionally valid practices of "underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering risks." It follows that if insurers
adopt a discriminatory exclusion or limitation that is not based on
one of the above mechanisms, the discriminatory benefit term
should be deemed unlawful. Again, this determination requires
justification of the challenged benefit term by the insurer and
judicial scrutiny.
The term "underwriting risks" refers to an insurer's decision
concerning whether, and on what basis, to accept a particular
customer. 121
The practice of classifying risks is the
"[c]ategorization on the basis of established criteria for rating
risks, establishing premiums and tabulating statistical
experience." 122 The term "administering risks" is not specifically
defined in the insurance literature, but it most probably relates
simply to the administration of the insurance plan. The commonly
accepted principles that underlie risk classification practices are
that the system should reflect expected cost differences, should
distinguish among 1isks on the basis of relevant cost factors, and
should be applied objectively. 123 Moreover, it is commonly
accepted that risk classification practices should promote
efficiency and fairness, and therefore, equal risks are not to be
treated differently and unequal risks are not to be treated the
same. 124
Consequently, in permitting insurers to underwrite and
classify risks, the ADA is pennitting them to engage in a process
of analysis of expected costs and experience involving different
risks. The statute cannot reasonably be construed as allowing
insurers to exclude or limit benefits for the treatment of disabilities
on an arbitrary or irrational basis. If insurers were allowed to do
so, the ADA's reference to the underwriting, classifying, and
administration of risks would have no meaning, and the statute's
I d. §§ 12112(a), 12182(a), 12181(7)(F).
See Karen A Oifford & Russel P. Inculano, AIDS and 111Surance: The Rationale for
AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1806, 1809 (1987). See also Pmllip E. Stano,
Underwriting in the Twentieth Century: Grafting Societal Values to the Regulation of Risk,
19 J. INS. REG. 273, 275 (2000); RUPP, supra note 22, at 335.
122 RUPP, supra note 22, at 76.
123 See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES COMM. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, RISK
120
121

CLASSIFICATION STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 2 (1980).
124 See id. at 8; KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 10-11 (1986); Stano supra
note 121 at 275-76.
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prohibition of discrimination with respect to insurance benefits
would have no force.
The courts' concern that judicial intrusion would generate
destabilization in the insurance industry is groundless. Requiring
insurers to avoid unfair discrimination and to base benefit terms
on actuarial analysis is consistent with existing insurance
principles. It is, in fact, what insurers are purportedly doing on
their own, and thus, the ADA merely formalizes what insurers
already understand to be their professional obligation. While
insurers have ample incentive to exclude or limit coverage for the
treatments that are going to be most costly for the plan, they have
a much weaker economic incentive to refuse reimbursement for
AIDS treatment or hearing devices if these are expected to be
sought rarely and to be less costly than other treatments that are
covered. 125 Exclusion or limitation of coverage for therapies that
will generate low expenditures for the health insurance plan will
not significantly reduce its expenses or prevent premiums from
rising. If the courts are called upon to ensure that challenged
insurance terms are based on valid analysis of cost data and are
not randomly discriminatory disability-based distinctions, the
courts will not in any way cause a "seismic shift"t26 in the insurance
industry. Rather, they will reinforce the industry's integrity and
underlying principles.
The courts' objection that they are not equipped to evaluate
financial and actuarial data is similarly unconvincing. The ADA
explicitly requires courts to engage in complex economic analysis
in other contexts. Title I of the ADA requires employers to
provide reasonable accmmnodations for individuals with
l 25 See Herman T. Bailey, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25
DRAKE L. REv. INS. L. ANN. 779, 824 (1976) ("Insurers are not concerned with
stereotyping individuals on the basis of whim, prejudice or surmise, but rather seek to
classify them on the basis of factors with statistically demonstrable relationships to the cost
of providing coverage."). In some cases insurers will be able to show that an AIDS cap,
for example, is based on expected cost-related factors. If many members of a particular
group have HIV or AIDS, then treatment for this illness may well be more expensive for
the plan that other covered therapies. Nevertheless, many defendants, like Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Company, will not be able to provide a cost-based justification for their
AIDS cap. The average lifetime health care costs for AIDS-related conditions was
estimated in 1999 to be $155,000. See Nancy R. Mansfield, Evolving Limitations on
Coverage for AIDS: Implications for Health Insurers and Employers under the ADA and
ERISA, 35 TORT & INs. L.J. 117, 117 (1999). Other procedures and therapies that are
routinely covered, such as liver transplants and end-stage renal disease care are more
costly for insurers. See id. at 132. Moreover, in the aggregate, it is more expensive for
insurers to cover treatment for heart and liver disease and for cancer than it is to cover
treatment for less frequently occurring diseases such as AIDS. See id. at 132-33.
L26 Ford v. Schering-Piough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3rd Cir. 1998).
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disabilities unless the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship upon the employer. 127 The statute further provides that in
order to determine whether an undue hardship would exist, the
court must consider the following four factors: (1) the nature and
cost of the needed accommodation; (2) the overall financial
resources of the facility involved; (3) the overall financial
resources of the employer as a whole, including all its facilities; and
(4) the employer's general operations. 128 Similarly, Title III of the
ADA provides an undue burden defense for public
accommodations that cannot accommodate individuals with
disabilities. 129 Presumably, an employer asserting an undue burden
defense in the Title III context would have to offer the court proof
that is similar to that required under Title I. If courts can evaluate
complex financial data in order to determine the validity of an
entity's undue hardship defense, there is no reason why they
127

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). The provision reads in relevant part:
(b) ... the term "discriminate" includes-

(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity;
!d.
128

42 U.S. C. § 12111(10)(B). The text provides:
(B) Factors to be considered. - In determining whether an accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered
include(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at
such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of
such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities in question to the covered entity.

!d.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). The text provides:
(A) ... discrimination includes-

129

(iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individucl
with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated
differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and
services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would
fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage,
or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden;
]d.
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should be deemed ill-equipped to evaluate financial data for
purposes of a section 501 (c) defense.
One problem that might arise is that insurers will offer
actuarial data that is out-dated or unreliable, since such data,
unfortunately, is often utilized in the risk-classification process.U0
As is the case generally in litigation, however, it will be up to the
plaintiff to convince the court that it should not rely on the
defendant's flawed evidence, and the courts will have to be trusted
to reach the correct conclusion.
2.

The Term "Subterfuge"

Much of the controversy relating to section 501(c) revolves
around the meaning of the term "subterfuge." I suggest, however,
that the emphasis on that word is misplaced. The "subterfuge"
provision adds a further prohibition that will apply in exceptional
cases, but it is not central to the meaning of the entirety of section
SOl( c).
The courts that have interpreted section 501(c) as providing a
comprehensive defense for insurers rely on the Supreme Court
case of Public Employee Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts. 131 The
case involved an age discrimination challenge to a plan that
disqualified employees from eligibility for disability retirement
benefits upon reaching the age of sixty. 132 At the time, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 133 contained a
provision that is similar to the ADA's section 501(c). Section
4(f)(2) of the ADEA provided an exemption for activities
undertaken to observe "the terms of ... any bona fide employee
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan,
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADEA]." 134
In the Betts case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann 135 holding that '"subterfuge'
means 'a scheme, plan stratagem, or artifice of evasion,' which, in
130 Insurers have been criticized for making risk classification decisions that are not ·
actuarially sound. See, e.g., Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Related
Health Insurance, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2503, 2505 (1992); Jolm Jacobi, The Ends of
Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 329 (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000).
m 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
132 See id. at 162.
133 29 U.S. C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1999). See infra in Part II.C, for a more detailed
discussion of the AD EA.
134 29 U.S. C. § 623(f)(2). The section was amended in 1990 and no longer contains the
"subterfuge" language. For the section's current text, see infra note 233.
135 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
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the context of § 4(f)(2), connotes a specific 'intent ... to evade a
statutory requirement. "' 136 It rejected EEOC guidelines that
construed the subterfuge clause as requiring cost justification for
age discrimination in benefit plans. 137 The Court reasoned that the
EEOC guidelines were not due any deference because they were
contrary to the plain language of the ADEA. 138 Consequently, a
plan adopted p1ior to the ADEA's enactment could not constitute
a subterfuge because it could not have been conceived with an
intent to evade the statutory purpose. 139 Finally, the Betts Court
held that in order to prove subterfuge, plaintiffs must prove that
the challenged plan provision was intended to discriminate in an
aspect of employment that is not itself related to fringe benefits,
such as to retaliate against an employee who filed a charge of
discrimination or to reduce the net earnings of older employees. 140
The courts that have adopted the Betts interpretation in the
ADA context have reasoned that Congress must have
incorporated the term "subterfuge" into the ADA in 1990 in light
of the Supreme Court's Betts decision in 1989 and thus intended
the term to have identical meanings in the two statutes. 141 This
interpretation bolsters their conclusion that the ADA does not
govern the contents of insurance policies because, under the Betts
precedent, benefit terms should not be vulnerable to judicial
scrutiny unless they were adopted specifically with discriminatory
intent. 142 Here too, however, the courts' reasoning is unsound.
Whether the Betts interpretation of "subterfuge" was right or
wrong, the two provisions at issue are easily distinguishable. First,
the ADEA's subterfuge clause was very different from that found
136

137

Betts, 492 U.S. at 171 (citing McMann, 434 U.S. at 203).
Id. at 170-71. The EEOC regulation provided that "[I]n general, a plan or plan

provision which prescribes lower benefits for older employees on account of age is not a
'subterfuge' within the meaning of section 4(f)(2), provided that the lower level of benefits
is justified by age-related cost consideration." ld. at 170, (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)
(1988)).
138 See id. at 171.
139 See id. at 167-68.
140 See id. at 180-81.
141 Leonard v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen
Congress chose the term 'subterfuge' for the insurance safe-harbor of the ADA, it was on
full alert as to what the court understood the word to mean and possessed (obviously) a
full grasp of the linguistic devices available to avoid that meaning"); Ford v. ScheringPlough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("Congress ... is presumed to have
adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of 'subterfuge' in the ADEA context when
Congress enacted the ADA"); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th
Cir. 1996) ("Had Congress intended to reject the Betts interpretation of subterfuge when
it enacted the ADA, it could have done so expressly by incorporating language for that
purpose into the bill").
142 See cases listed supra note 141.
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in the ADA. Unlike section 501(c), the ADEA's provision made
no mention of risk classification or underwriting practices. As
argued previously, by referring to these mechanisms, the ADA
mandates that only legitimate cost analysis will justify an otherwise
discriminatory benefit term. Second, in 1990 Congress removed
the subterfuge clause from the ADEA, and thus it did not retain
two provisions that contain identical words that should be
construed as having identical meanings. It cannot, therefore, be
argued that section 501(c) excuses all insurer conduct that was not
specifically intended to evade the purpose of the statute.
Accordingly, it is incorrect to conclude that plans adopted
before the ADA are exempt from the anti-discrimination mandate
because they could not have been implemented with an intent to
evade the purposes of the ADA. 143 Rather, benefit terms that
discriminate on the basis of disability must be scrutinized by the
courts on their own merit to determine whether they comply with
statutory requirements.
Nevertheless, I propose that the term "subterfuge" in section
501(c) can be read to mean "with an intent to evade statutory
purposes," as it does according to the Betts Court, without
weakening the argument that the provision as a whole requires
cost justification. Because the cost analysis is required by the
ADA's reference to "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or
administering risks" in the first two paragraphs of the provision,
the discussion of subterfuge likely has a different purpose.
Specifically, the subterfuge clause provides that "Paragraphs
(1), (2), and (3) [of section SOl( c)] shall not be used as a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of [the Act] .... " 144 This language imposes
an additional obligation on insurance providers that goes beyond
those addressed in the first three paragraphs. An insurance
provider whose disability-based distinction is challenged under the
ADA can avoid liability by proving that the distinction is
consistent with cost-based risk classification and underwriting
principles.
However, a defendant who provides a valid
justification, will nonetheless be found to have violated the ADA
if the plaintiff proves that the discriminatory benefit term was
adopted with an intent to discriminate rather than purely to save
costs.
For example, an insurer may be able to prove that its AIDS
cap is actuarially justified because of very high anticipated costs in
the insured pool. However, if the plaintiff produces an internal
143
144

See Leonard, 199 F.3d at 105.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
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memo stating that the AIDS cap was in truth adopted because the
insurer believes people with AIDS cause their own illness by
engaging in immoral conduct, deserve to be sick, and should not
receive medical treatment, the section 501( c) defense will not
apply.
The coverage limitation was adopted in order to
discriminate against individuals with AIDS, and not solely for
reasons of cost. Similarly, if an employer is shown to have adopted
a policy with an AIDS cap because it wanted an employee with
AIDS to resign, the AIDS cap will be deemed a subterfuge, in
violation of the ADA, even if the employer can prove an actuarial
basis for it.
3.

Administrative Guidance

Administrative guidance has been issued by the EEOC
regarding the application of the ADA's Title I to health insurance,
and by the DOJ, which enforces Title III, and both have provided
consistent interpretations of section 501(c). 145 Under Chevron
USA. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 146 reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions are
entitled to judicial deference. 147 The circuit courts have generally
ignored the agencies' guidance, and one court explicitly rejected it,
stating that it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. 148
However, as is evident from the courts' repeated struggles to
interpret section 501 (c), the provision's plain meaning is not free
of ambiguity and requires lengthy explication. The administrative
145

Employee Benefits, supra note 72; EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 73; 29 C.P.R.
§ 1630.16(f) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000).

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See id. at 842-44. In Chevron, the Supreme Court developed a two-step analysis to
determine the degree of judicial deference appropriate for administrative interpretations
of law. First, the court must determine whether the statute clearly speaks to the question
at hand, and if so, the court must implement the plainly expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the statute does not address the pertinent issue or provides ambiguous guidance,
courts should accept any reasonable interpretation offered by the enforcing administrative
agency. See id.
The Chevron decision can be explained through several rationales.
First,
administrative agencies have expertise with respect to the legislation at issue and practical
knowledge regarding administration of the statutory scheme. Second, the decision
reinforces the separation of powers by assigning policy judgments to the executive branch
rather than the courts. Tlllrd, according to Justice Scalia, in some cases Congress had no
specific intent with respect to the question at issue and meant to leave its resolution to the
administrative agency. Chevron thus instructs courts to implement Congressional intent
by deferring to agency guidance. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511,514-16 (1989).
148 See Leonard v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 106 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999).
146
147
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guidelines that have been issued are detailed and thoughtful.
Because the EEOC and DOJ have provided reasonable and
consistent guidance, their statutory interpretations should receive
deference from the courts.
The DOJ's Title III Technical Assistance Manual explains:
[A] public accommodation may offer [an insurance] plan that
limits certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk,
but may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or
limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an
individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except
where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably
anticipated experience. 149
Likewise, in commenting on an employer's obligations with
respect to health insurance, the EEOC explains that "[t]he
employer may prove that the disability-based disparate treatment
is justified by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably
anticipated experience, and that conditions with comparable
actuarial data and/or experience are treated the same way. " 150
149 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE III
TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE MANUAL III-3.11000 (1993).
In addition, the DOJ's
interpretive guidance states that "[b]ecause the legislative history of the ADA clarifies
that different treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance may be justified by
sound actuarial data, such actuarial data will be critical to any potential litigation on this
issue." 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000).
150 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0024. The guidance continues:
Actuarial data will measure both the likelihood that the employer will incur
insurance costs related to the disability and the magnitude of those costs as they
arise. Thus, employers must show that the reduction in coverage for the
disability or disabilities is required to account for an increased possibility that
the benefit will be claimed or that the amounts required for coverage will be
higher. Employers may not, however, rely on actuarial data that is outdated or
that is based on myths, fears, stereotypes, or assumptions about the disability at
issue.
Even where employers can produce actuarial data that demonstrates that the
risks and costs of treatment of a condition justify differential treatment of it,
employers must also show that they have treated other conditions that pose the
same risks and costs the same way. If there is evidence that an employer has
treated other conditions differently from the disability at issue, the employer has
discriminated by singling out a particular disability for disadvantageous
treatment.
Id. The EEOC provides this explanation as an interpretation of the term "subterfuge."
As argued above, I believe that the EEOC is correct in stating that section 501(c) requires
actuarial justification for disability-based distinctions, but I argue that cost analysis is
mandated by the provision's reference to the underwriting and classifying of risks, not by
the term "subterfuge."
In addition, the EEOC guidance focuses on section 501(c)'s requirement that an
insurance plan be "bona fide." The guidance provides the following explanation
concerning the term "bona fide":
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Thus, both agencies conclude that the ADA governs the content of
insurance policies and that insurance providers must furnish a costbased justification for challenged disability-based distinctions.
The EEOC offers additional defenses for employers whose
insurance plans contain disability-based distinctions. Employers
can prove that the different treatment is necessary to maintain the
solvency of the benefit plan 151 or "to avoid unacceptable changes in
the coverage of, or the premiums for, a benefit plan. " 152 Although
the EEOC does not explicitly state this, these defenses seem to
arise from the general principle that employers are excused from
accommodating individuals with disabilities if the accommodation
will cause them undue hardship. 153 While DOJ guidelines do not
address the issue, it is reasonable to conclude that insurers could
similarly avoid liability under Title III by asserting an "undue
burden" defense, because the defense is available not only to
employers, but also to public accommodations. 154
EEOC guidance also explicitly rejects application of the Betts
Under the tirst prong of the defense, an employer must demonstrate that its plan
is either a bonafide insured plan that is not inconsistent with state law, or a bona
fide self-insured plan. (In a footnote, the EEOC explains that self-insured plans
are not subject to state laws that regulate insurance]. To be bona fide, a plan
must exist and pay benefits; in addition, the terms of the plan must have been
accurately communicated to eligible employees.
I d. at 627:0023.
151 I d. at 627:0024. The guidance elaborates:
To establish this defense, employers must show:
• that covering the disability or disabilities at issue would require such
substantial payments of benefits that it would threaten the fiscal soundness of
the plan under commonly accepted or legally required standards, and
• that there is no non-disability-based benefit plan change that could be made to
limit those fiscal consequences.
I d.
152 /d. The guidance further explains:
An "unacceptable" change is a drastic increase in premium payments (or in copayments or deductibles), or a drastic alteration to the scope of coverage or level
of benefits provided, that would:
• increase the cost to other employees so substantially that the benefit plan
would be effectively unavailable to a significant number of them;
• make the benefit plan so unattractive as to result in significant adverse
selection; or
e make the benefit plan so unattractive that the employer carmot compete in
recruiting and maintaining qualified workers due to the superiority of benefit
plans offered by other employers in the community.
ld. The guidance also provides a final, rather obvious defense for an employer, which is
that it can prove "that a particular treatment that it has excluded from a health insurance
plan provides no medical benefit." !d.
153 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(S)(A) (1994). See Marcosson, supra note 7, at 429-30, for
criticism that EEOC guidelines are too lenient and create too many loopholes for
employers.
154 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
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decision to ADA cases. 155 The EEOC asserts that the ADA
applies to plans that were adopted prior to the statute's enactment
and to insurance terms that are facially discriminatory even if they
do not discriminate with respect to non-benefit employment
decisions. 156
4.

Legislative History

Reliance on legislative history is disfavored by the current
Supreme Court.t57 Reportedly, during the 1981 term, the Court
utilized legislative history in almost all of its statutory cases,t58 but
by 1993, only a small number of cases analyzed legislative history,
and no majority opinion cited legislative history as essential to its
decision.t 59 As demonstrated above, section 501(c) can be
interpreted based on its text and in light of the detailed and
reasonable administrative guidelines that were developed by the
DOJ and EEOC. Nevertheless, as some scholars have argued,
legislative history can be valuable in interpreting difficult text, tfio
tss See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0024.
See id.
157 Justice Scalia in particular has argued vigorously against the use of legislative history
as an authoritative source for a statute's meaning. See Scalia, supra note 145, at 16, 29-36.
Scalia believes that legislative intent is not a proper criterion for statutory interpretation
since judges must focus on what the legislature said, not what it might have theoretically
intended. Furthermore, Scalia notes that floor debates are generally poorly attended and
committee reports are rarely read, and thus it is naive to believe that legislators vote
according to what they hear during debates or read in reports. In fact, he believes that in
many cases language contained in floor debates or committee reports is prewritten by
lawyer-lobbyists who have access to sympathetic legislators and wish to shape the
legislative history for purposes of future judicial interpretation. According to Scalia, any
significant statute will be accompanied by extensive legislative history that will contain
statements that potentially support varied and even contradictory understandings of the
text. Thus, it is only the enacted statute itself that represents actual Congressional intent.
Scalia concludes that if legislative history is abandoned as an interpretive tool, "[i]udges,
lawyers, and clients will be saved an enormous amount of [wasted] time and expense." I d.
at36.
l 58 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on rhe Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Tem1, 68 Iow A L. REv. 195, 196-98 (1983).
59
l
See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In
Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REv. 393, 398 (1996) (noting that Justice Scalia
joined the Court during the 1988 term). See also Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester
W Roth Lecture: On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 845, 846 (1992) (noting that in the 1990 term, the Supreme Court decided nineteen
out of approximately fifty-five statutory cases without the use of legislative history).
160 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 224 (1999) (arguing that when terms
are ambiguous or provisions are excessively broad, legislative history should be used as an
interpretive mechanism because "[w]ords are hard to understand without some conception
of their purpose, and the distinction between purpose and intention ... is thin"). See also
156
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and thus, the ADA's legislative history merits some attention.
The legislative history supports the view that the ADA is
intended to govern the content of health insurance policies and to
require actuarial or cost-based justification for disability-based
distinctions. The issue of insurance is addressed in three
committee reports: the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee report, the House Education and Labor Committee
report, and the House Judiciary Committee report. 161 Professor
Chai Feldblum, one of the authors of the ADA, has stated that the
language of the Senate Labor Committee report was "negotiated,
line by line, among all parties" including the insurance companies,
lawyers for the disability community, and Senate staff. 162 Its value,
therefore, cannot be discounted under the theory that it represents
the view of only one special interest group that lobbied
Congress. 163
The Senate report states the following:
[W]hile a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on
classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the
plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or
limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an
individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except
where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably
anticipated experience. 164

The report further explains that "section 501 (c) is intended to
afford to insurers and employers the same opportunities they
would enjoy in the absence of this legislation to design and
administer insurance products and benefit plans in a manner that
is consistent with basic principles of insurance risk classification. " 165
Accordingly, the authors of section 501 (c) did not intend it to
leave insurers unconstrained in their ability to establish
disc1iminatory benefit exclusions and limitations. Rather, to avoid
Breyer, supra note 159, at 848-61 (arguing that reliance upon legislative history is
appropriate: for five distinct purposes: (1) to avoid absurd interpretive results; (2) to
illuminate apparent drafting errors; (3) to elucidate specialized meanings that statutory
words may have; (4) to identify the purpose of a law's terminology within the broader
statutory context; and (5) to select the most appropriate of several reasonable
interpretations of a politically controversial provision.).
161 See Feldblum, supra note 70, at 143 n.105.
162 ld. at 113.
163 This addresses one of Justice. Scalia's primary concerns about legislative history,
discussed supra note 157.
164 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989).
165 I d. at 85-86.
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violation of the ADA, insurers must utilize accepted actuarial
principles or data concerning reasonable cost experience when
setting their benefit terms.
Finally, the Senate report explicitly states that the ADA's
anti-discrimination mandate applies to insurance plans "regardless
of the date an insurance plan or employer benefit plan was
adopted. " 166 The legislative history, therefore, does not support
the view that the Betts decision is to apply to the ADA in order to
preclude liability with respect to plans adopted before the statute's
enactment.
The two House of Representatives reports contain identical
language. They provide that any exclusion, limitation, or rate
differential in insurance plans must be "based on sound actuarial
principles or . . . [be] related to actual or reasonably anticipated
experience." 167 They also state that the ADA governs insurance
practices regardless of the date of the plan's adoption. 168 Because
the legislative history is thoroughly consistent, was co-authored by
all interested parties and not by just a single interest group,. and
clearly explains ambiguous language, it is useful as a tool to
interpret section 501 (c) and powerfully negates the conclusion of
the circuit courts concerning the provision's meaning.
E.

Summary

The circuit courts have construed the ADA too narrowly.
The plain text of section 501(c), its legislative history, and
administrative agency guidance all support the conclusion that the
ADA governs the contents of insurance policies and requires
insurance providers to justify their disability-based distinctions
utilizing valid actuarial principles or cost-related experience.
Nevertheless, the ADA provides only limited protection in
the insurance realm to individuals with disabilities. First, the
ADA applies only to disability-based distinctions and does not
regulate discriminatory terms that affect medical conditions that
are not disabilities or that affect a combination of disabilities and
non-disabilities. 169 This is a very significant exception because it
166

!d. at 85.
H.R REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 137 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420; id.
pt. 3, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 494.
168 H.R REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419; id.
pt. 3, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 494.
169 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0022. See also discussion supra Part
I. B.
167
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eliminates the possibility of successfully challenging many
traditional insurance limitations such as those relating to ment:tl
health care, eye care, and in-patient hospital days. Second, the
ADA does not per se prohibit utilization of disability-based
distinctions such as AIDS-caps. Rather, it allows employers to
retain discriminatory insurance terms if they can prove a basis for
them in sound actuarial principles, past cost experience, or
evidence regarding reasonably anticipated benefit claims, so long
as there is no evidence that the insurer intended to evade the
purposes of the ADAY0
Finally, employers can avoid all insurance challenges under
Title I by not providing employees with health care benefits. 171 In
the alternative, employers can avoid accusations of discrimination
by providing each employee with a set dollar amount to be used
towards the purchase of health insurance. This approach is called
"defined contribution," and is predicted by some to become
increasingly popular in the near future. 172 The AD A may thus
170

See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1990). See also discussion supra Part

I. B.
171 See Richard Epstein, Rationing Access to Medical Care: Some Sober Second
Thoughts, 1 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 81, 87 (1991) ("Once employers are told that if they
choose to provide any medical care, they must provide a long list of benefits, it may well
be that they will choose to provide no one any benefits at all."); see also Jeffrey G.
Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured Health
Plans, 14 VA. TAX REv. 615, 618 (1995) (noting that "employers are not required to
provide any health coverage to their workers.").
172 Julie A Jacob, Consumer-Driven Health Plans Could Mean End of Capitation, AM.
MED. "NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 15, 18 ("Some sort of consumer-driven, definedcontribution approach is coming."); Lisa Stammer, Healthcare from a New Perspective:
Defined Contribution Plans Will Shift the Focus to Individual Choice and Competition,
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, May 2001, at 27. The Stammer article describes different
models of defined contributions. Employers could choose to give employees an
established dollar amount so that the employee can choose her preferred coverage
package and pay any costs that exceed the base amount provided by the employer.
Alternatively, employers might identify a variety of health plans and promise employees
to pay a base amount directly to the health plan. Employees would be responsible for all
costs that exceed that amount or would receive reimbursement if their chosen option costs
less than the employer's pledged base amount. Finally, employers can choose to establish
medical savings accounts for employees internally, with a financial institution, or with an
HMO. See id. See also, Linda Havlin & Bill Maloney, Defining the New Health Care
Benefit Models, EMPLOYEE BENEFJT PLAN REV., Jan. 2001, at 16-18; Paul Fronstin,
Employee-Based Health Benefits: Trends and Outlook, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, May 2001, at
20-22; Greg Scandlen, Everything (and more) You Ever Wanted to Know about Defined
Contribution Health Plans, Pmt 11, HEALTH INS. UNDERWRITER, Jan. 2001, at 48, 54. The
Scandlen article notes that defined contributions have several advantages for both
employers and employees. Employers can avoid the burdens of choosing and managing
health care plans, decrease administrative costs and perhaps increase employee morale by
giving workers freedom to choose their own benefit programs. Employees can select from
among all options available in the individual market and can customize their benefits
according to their needs and preferences. See id. at 49-50. Other commentators, however,
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create incentives for employers to stop serving as the direct
providers of health insurance for the majority of working
Americans. 173
II.

TITLE VII AND OTHER ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
A.

Title VII

1. The Statutory Text

Title VII provides, in relevant part, that covered employers
may not "discriminate against any individual with respect to ...
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
migin." 174 Title VII includes a 1978 amendment known as the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination
based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical cmiditions"
and requires that women affected by these conditions receive
"benefits under fringe benefit programs" that are equivalent to
those given to other employees. 175
Unlike the ADA, Title VII applies only to employment
discrimination. 176 Thus, benefits that are provided by employers
are regulated by the statute, but those purchased directly from an
insurance company are not governed by Title VII. 177 The Supreme
Court has stated that because Title VII's anti-discrimination
mandate relates only to employment practices and does not
directly govern the insurance industry, its application to employerprovided health insurance benefits is not precluded by the

note several disadvantages of defined contributions including (1) the fact that the
individual market is more limited and less cost-effective than the group market, (2) that
employees may choose to pocket the cash rather than use it to purchase health benefits
and thus will join the population of the uninsured, and (3) that employers will lose the tax
savings associated with providing insurance benefits to employees. See id.
173 Approximately 65 percent of Americans under sixty-five receive health insurance
benefits through employers. See Fronstin, supra note 172, at 4.
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). A covered employer is defined as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year." !d. § 2000e(b ). Several exemptions, however, are established in the
provision. See id.
175 !d. § 2000e(k). For the full text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act see supra note
12.
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
177 See id.
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McCarran-Ferguson Act. 178
Contemporary insurers have eliminated consideration of race,
color, religion, and national origin in rate setting and risk
classification.179 Sex-based classifications, however, remain a
vigorously disputed practice. 180 Some advocates argue that because
sex is an immutable characteristic, gender-based categorization is
no less deplorable than race-based classifications and should
likewise be abandoned. 181
Others contend that actuarial
experience reveals cost differentials among males and females, and
therefore premium rates and classifications should reflect these
economic realities. 182
While insurers may include consideration of gender in their
risk classification practices, employers, under Title VII, are not
free to provide unequal benefits to male and female employees.
Consequently, gender-based tables may not be used to establish
the terms or premium prices of policies that are purchased by
employers to effectuate their benefit plans, though they may be
used for non-employer-provided policies. The application of Title
VII to employer-provided benefits was analyzed by the Supreme
Court in three seminal cases.
The case of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart183 involved an employee group retirement plan that
required women to make higher monthly contributions than men
in order to receive equivalent monthly pension payments because,
according to valid actuarial tables, women generally live longer
than men. 184 The Court held that the differential violated Title
VII. 185 It reasoned that Title VII prohibited discrimination against
individuals and "precludes treatment of individuals as simply
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. " 186
Thus, although women as a class live longer than men, any
particular woman may have a shorter life than the average man's
178

See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1087 n.17 (1983) ("By its
own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies only to the business of insurance and has
no application to employment practices."). For a detailed discussion of the McCarranFerguson Act, see supra Part I.A.
179 See Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the
Actuaries, 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 365 (1986); HARNEIT & LESNICK, supra note 6,
§ 13.03[1].
180 See HARNEIT & LESNICK, supra note 6, § 13.05(6)( a).
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 435 u.s. 702 (1978).
184 See id. at 704-05.
185 See id. at 717.
186 Id. at 708.
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and, consequently, female employees could not be forced to make
higher monthly payments solely by virtue of their gender. 187
A similar case, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 188
involved Arizona's voluntary pension plan under which all of the
companies selected by the state to participate in the plan used sexbased mortality tables and paid women lower monthly retirement
benefits than they paid men who had made equivalent
contributions. 189 The Court noted that gender was the only
consideration used to classify individuals of the same age without
regard to other factors affecting longevity, such as smoking,
alcohol use, and weight. 19° Citing its Manhart decision, the Court
declared that the practice was unlawful under Title VIL 191
Finally, in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 192 the Supreme Court addressed a health insurance term
that provided unequal maternity benefits for female employees
and the spouses of male employees. 193 While female employees
received hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-related conditions
that were equivalent to hospitalization benefits for other medical
conditions, the wives of male employees received less extensive
coverage. 194 The Court found that the health insurance plan was
unlawfully discriminatory because it gave "married male
employees a benefit package for their dependents that . . . [was]
less inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to married
female employees." 195
It follows from these Supreme Court cases that in order to
prove a Title VII violation, a plaintiff must make a direct
comparison between the benefits received by men and women and
show that in some respect the insurance coverage available to one
187

See id.
463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
See id. at 1077. Employees participating in the plan could postpone the receipt of a
portion of their earnings until after retirement, thereby delaying the payment of federal
income taxes on their wages. Arizona invited private companies to submit bids and
describe the investment opportunities they would offer the state employees. It then
selected several companies from among them to participate in the program. Employees
subsequently chose one of the available companies and decided how much money they
wished to defer each month. The state withheld the money from the employees'
paychecks, channeled it to the designated companies, and administered the plan. See id. at
1076-77.
190 See id. at 1077.
191 See id. at 1080-84.
192 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
193 See id. at 672-73.
194 See id.
195 Id. at 684 (referring specifically to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in reaching its
conclusion).
188
189
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gender is inferior to that available to the other sex. Jennifer
Erickson was able to do just that when she challenged her plan's
refusal to cover prescription contraceptives. 196 Citing the Newport
News decision, the court emphasized that "equality under Title
VII is measured by evaluating the relative comprehensiveness of
coverage offered to the sexes." 197 Accordingly, the court found
that a prescription plan's exclusion of reimbursement for
medication that can be used only by women constitutes sex
discrimination under Title Vll. 198 It explained: "the exclusion of
prescription contraceptives ... reduces the comprehensiveness of
the coverage offered to female employees while leaving the
coverage offered to male employees unchanged." 199
The analytical soundness of the Erickson decision, however, is
open to criticism. The plaintiff did not make a direct comparison
between prescription contraceptives, for which coverage was
denied to women, and a comparable medication that was covered
for men. In fact, there are no prescription contraceptives for men
at the present time. Furthermore, at least arguably, the denial of
coverage affects men and women equally, since the woman and
her partner must choose an alternate fmm of birth control or
perhaps pay for the pill out of pockeU00 The court's decision
revolved around the somewhat tenuous argument that the
employer's plan provided complete prescriptive drug coverage for
men 201 and incomplete coverage for women because it denied
benefits for one medication that many women choose to utilize. It
is not clear, however, that future courts will follow this precedent.
By contrast to the Erickson case, in Kraul v. Iowa Methodist
Medical Center,202 the court found that an employer-provided
plan's exclusion of treatment for infertility did not violate Title
VIJ.2 03 The court reasoned that when a couple is unable to have a
196

See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1276-77 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
ld. at 1271.
198 See id. at 1271-72.
199 /d. at 1275.
200 See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no
violation of Title VII with respect to denial of coverage for infertility treatments because it
affects men and women equally). While many women who seek oral contraceptives are
unmarried and may be solely responsible for their birth control needs, some women
seeking fertility treatments will also be unmarried and seeking to start families on their
own for a variety of reasons.
201 According to both parties, the court acknowledged that the prescription plan did not
cover Viagra. However, the court stated only that this exclusion may also violate Title VII
and left this determination to other courts that will be faced with the issue. See Erickson,
141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
2o2 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
203 See id. at 681.
197
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child, they are both affected by the infertility and must bear the
cost of treatment, regardless of which one is infertile. It
determined that the plaintiff had failed to present statistical
evidence demonstrating that "female participants in IMMC's
medical plan and their dependent spouses incurred a
disproportionate amount of the cost of infertility treatments as
compared with male Plan participants and their dependent
spouses. "204
It should be noted that plaintiff's claim was based on a
disparate impact theory, alleging that the exclusion of
reimbursement for procedures to treat infertility had a greater
adverse effect for women than it did for men. 205 Unlike the ADA,
Title VII allows plaintiffs to make disparate impact claims relating
to health insurance coverage. 206 In order to overcome a disparate
impact challenge, an employer must show that the insurance term
in question is justified by a factor other than sex, such as business
necessity207 or generally accepted medical criteria. 208
204 !d. See also Sales v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(dismissing plaintiffs Title VII and PDA claims relating to her plan's exclusion of
coverage for infertility treatments).
205 See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 681. For an explanation of the disparate impact theory see
supra Part I.B.3.
206 See Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding
that "disparate impact analysis is appropriate" in a Title VII case challenging an
employer's "head of household" policy of allowing employees to obtain coverage for their
spouses only if the employee earned more than half of the couple's combined wages). See
also EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 1988) (using disparate impact
analysis to challenge defendant's "head of household" rule); Employee Benefits, supra
note 72, at 627:0026 (noting that EEOC guidelines allow for the use of the disparate
impact theory in Title VII cases).
In ADA cases, the use of the disparate impact theory is inappropriate because
insurance terms that are facially neutral and affect both people with disabilities and people
without disabilities are not disability-based distinctions and therefore are not covered by
the ADA. See discussion supra Part I.B.4. ADA analysis is complicated by the threshold
questions of whether the plaintiff is an individual with a disability and whether the
challenged term is a disability-based distinction. By contrast, Title VII analysis is simpler.
All individuals are entitled to statutory protection so long as they have suffered
discrimination because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Consequently,
insurance terms that are facially neutral and are applicable to both sexes, but impact one
gender to a greater extent than the other, may violate the statute.
207 See Wambheim, 705 F.2d at 1495 (finding the "head of household" rule justified by
the employer's policy of keeping insurance costs as low as possible for all employees); J. C.
Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 254 (holding that the "head of household" rule is justified because
the defendant "wanted the biggest "bang for the buck" with its benefit package, and
adopted this plan for that reason."). A head of household provision allows an employee
to choose coverage for a spouse only if the employee earns more than the spouse. !d. at
250.
208 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0026-27 (depicting as an example, an
employer that excludes coverage for "experimental treatments" and stating that such an
employer may refuse to reimburse a breast cancer patient for a bone marrow transplant if
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In Reger v. Espy, 209 the plaintiff, like Ms. Kraul, failed in her
attempt to challenge a plan provision utilizing the disparate impact
theory. She alleged that her employer violated Title VII when its
insurance plan excluded from coverage high dose chemotherapy
and autologous bone marrow transplant ("HDC-ABMT") to treat
breast cancer because the exclusion had a disparate impact on
women. 210 The court found that the plan refused to provide
reimbursement for HDC-ABMT for most diagnoses, other than
five specific cancers. 211 The exclusion therefore affected both men
and women, and the plaintiff failed to prove her disparate impact
case. 212
2.

Legislative History and EEOC Guidelines

The prohibition against discrimination based on gender was
added to Title VII on the last day of debates in the House of
Representatives, 213 and very little legislative history exists
concerning the provision. 214 The legislative history, therefore, is
not enlightening with respect to the applicability of Title VII's
original prohibition on sex disc1imination to health insurance
benefits.
More expansive legislative history exists concerning Title
VII's 1978 amendment, the PDA. The record asserts, for example,
that the PDA does not dictate that employers must provide
hospital coverage for delivery. 215 However, if an employer
generally offers reimbursement for medical costs, it must provide

it can prove that it used generally accepted medical criteria to conclude that the procedure
is experimental).
209 836 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
210 See id. at 870, 872.
211 See id. at 872.
212 See id Several international clinical trials that were completed a number of years
after the decision was issued showed that HDC-ABMT is not effective in prolonging the
life of breast cancer patients. See Patricia C. Kuszler, Financing Clinical Research and
Experimental Therapies: Payment Due, But From Whom?, 3 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CAREL.
441, 459-60 (2000).
213 The gender classification was proposed by Representative Smith of Virginia, who
voted against the Civil Rights Act. He apparently hoped to "clutter up" Title VII and
increase general opposition to it so that it would not be passed. See 110 CONG. REc. 257784 (1964); see also Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141, 144 n.4 (E.D.
Mich. 1974).
2l4 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986); see also Marcelo L.
Riffaud, Fetal Protection and UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Job Openings for Barren
Women Only, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 843, 845 (1990).
215 123 CONG. REC. 29,642 (1977).
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reimbursement on the same basis for expenses related to
pregnancy, delivery, and related conditions. 216 The legislative
history asserts that the law requires that "pregnant women be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or
inability to work." 217
The EEOC has issued guidance concerning the application of
Title VII and the PDA to health insurance benefits. 218 The EEOC
guidelines explain that employers cannot provide different
coverage to males and females if the underlying condition affects
both men and women or if the treatment or diagnostic method is
available for both genders. 219 The guidelines emphasize that
disparate impact analysis is available to Title VII plaintiffs and
that employers must offer the same terms of coverage for
treatment during pregnancy, delivery, and "related medical
conditions" as for other treatments. 220
According to its statutory language, caselaw, legislative
history, and administrative guidance, Title VII prohibits employerprovided insurance plans from adopting coverage distinctions
based on gender and pregnancy-related conditions. A plaintiff
who cannot show a direct disparity will not be able to prove a
statutory violation. Moreover, since Title VII applies only to
employer-provided insurance plans, its effect on the insurance
industry as a whole is limited. Finally, employers can avoid
accusations of insurance discrimination under Title VII by offering
employees no insurance benefits or by providing defined
contributions and thus avoiding involvement with the specific
terms of the employees' insurance policies. 221
B.

The Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act ("EPA"Y!2 requires, in general terms, that
employers pay equal wages to men and women for equal work 223
and applies to fringe benefits as a component of employees'
compensation packages. 224 EPA claims involve exclusively gender
216

See id.; see also S. REP. No. 95-331 (1977).
S. REP. No. 95-331 (1977).
218 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0025- 28.
219 See id. at 627:0026.
220 I d. at 627:0026-27.
221 See discussion supra Part I.E.
m 29 U.S. C. §§ 206-19 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
223 !d. § 206.
224 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0025 n.87; EEOC v. Fremont Christian
217
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discrimination and are most often brought together with Title VII
claims. 225 EPA plaintiffs must show a coverage disparity between
the insurance benefits available to men and women in equivalent
jobs, and therefore the analysis of EPA claims is very similar to the
analysis of cases brought under Title VIJ.2 26 A large number of
EPA cases, however, are dismissed because plaintiffs fail to prove
that their work was in fact equivalent to that of the members of the
opposite gender to which they are comparing themselves. 227
Furthermore, like Title VII, the EPA applies only to employerprovided health insurance and not to the health insurance industry
at large.Z28 Consequently, it is similarly limited in the extent to
which it protects the American public against discrimination m
health insurance.
C.

The Age Discrilnination in Employment Act

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 229
prohibits employment discrimination based on age 230 and protects
individuals who are 40 years old or older. 231 The ADEA is similar
to Title VII in terms of language, structure, purpose, and
analysis. 232 The statute, however, does not require that employers
School, 781 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986).
225 See, e.g., Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d at 1362; Warnbheim v. J.C. Penney Co.,
Inc., 705 F.2d 1492, 1493 (9th Cir. 1983); Willett v. Emory and Henry College, 427 F. Supp.
631, 632 (W.D. Va. 1977); Taylor v. Franklin Drapery Co., 441 F. Supp. 279, 281 (W.D.
Mo. 1977); Beavers v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 751 F. Supp. 956, 958 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
226 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0025 n.87 (discussing Title VII and
stating that "the same basic principles apply to charges of gender discrimination brought
under the EPA").
227 See e.g., Wolf v. Northwest Indiana Symphony, 250 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 2001)
(granting employer's motion for summary judgment in part because the plaintiff conceded
that the female employees to whom he compared himself had different job duties than
he); Beavers, 751 F. Supp. at 966 ("Mr. Beavers has not even attempted to point to a
female who performed substantially equal work as did he"); Jensen v. Kellings Fine Foods,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7221, at *23 (D. Kan. 1987) ("[P]Iaintiff has failed to meet her
burden of showing that work she performed in the beauty aids and housewares
department was substantially equal to that of the department heads").
228 29 U.S. C. § 206 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
229 Id. §§ 621-34.
23o I d. § 623(a). The provision reads in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.
I d.
231 Id. § 631(a).
232 See HARNEIT & LESNICK, supra note 6, § 13.04[2][a]; Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546
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offer older employees health insurance benefits that are equivalent
to those available to younger workers. Rather, it mandates only
that employers spend equal amounts of money or incur equal costs
for insurance benefits provided to older and younger members of
the workforce. 233 This provision is based on the fact that the cost
of health insurance benefits generally rises as an employee's age
advances because people's health deteriorates as they grow
older. 234 The ADEA, therefore, does not comprehensively
regulate the contents of health insurance plans and does not
require that individuals in different age categories be offered
benefits that are substantively equivalent. Furthermore, like Title
VII and the EPA, it governs only employer-provided health
insurance. The ADEA, consequently, provides older Americans
with very limited protection against age discrimination in health
msurance.
D.

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). 235 HIP AA requires that all group
F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 1976), em. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979) ("The prohibitions of the
ADEA are in terms virtually identical to those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
except that 'age' has been substituted for 'race, color, religion, sex or national origin."')
(internal citation omitted). However, some courts have held that disparate impact claims
may not be brought under the ADEA. See, e.g., Adams v. Florida Power Corp. 255 F.3d
1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (disallowing a disparate impact claim under the ADEA). The
Eleventh Circuit noted that: "The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits allow disparate
impact claims under the AD EA. The First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth do not." Id.
233 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i). The provision reads in relevant part:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization ...
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of payment
made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or
incurred on behalf of a younger worker.
Id.
It should also be noted that under Medicare law, an employer must offer its
Medicare-eligible employees the same health benefits that it offers similarly situated
employees under the age of 65. See 42 U.S. C.§ 1395y(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2001). Thus, an
employer may not take the availability of Medicare into account when establishing an
employee's health benefits. See also Erie County Retirees Ass'n. v. County of Erie, Pa.,
220 F.3d 193, 197-98, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that a defendant who offered Medicareeligible retirees health insurance benefits that were inferior to those provided to retirees
who were not eligible for Medicare was not entitled to summary judgment unless the
defendant could show that it could meet the equal benefit or equal cost standard).
234 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0006.
235 42 U.S. C. §§ 300gg-300gg-92 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
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health plans limit to no more than twelve months their period of
excluded coverage for preexisting conditions; that is, conditions for
which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was
recommended or received in the prior six months. 236 IllPAA's
portability provisions guarantee that individuals covered by group
insurance at one employer for eighteen continuous months will be
granted access to any group policy offered by a new employer. 237
Furthermore, IDPAA requires insurers operating in the
small-group market 238 to guarantee issue of all the products they
offer in the small-group market to all small groups, and, in any
group, all eligible members of the group must be offered
enrollment, regardless of their health status. 239 In addition, a group
health plan may not require any member of a group to pay a
higher premium than other members of the group because of a
healthstatus-related factor. 240 The statute requires all group
carriers, in both large and small group markets, to guarantee
renewal of their products. 241
IDPAA also reaches individual health insurance policies. It
guarantees the portability of group insurance to individual
insurance for certain individuals242 and requires that all individual
policy coverage be guaranteed renewable. 243 The statute does not
restrict the amount of premium that an insurer may charge a

236 /d. § 300gg(a). In the case of a late enrollee, the period of excluded coverage may
be extended to 18 months. !d. In addition, group insurers must generally credit enrollees
for any time during which they were previously excluded from coverage because of a
preexisting condition exclusion that was applied to them by a previous insurer.- !d. §§
300gg(a), (c).
237 !d. § 300gg-11. Tllis portability requirement is designed to alleviate the concerns of
employees who were reluctant to leave current jobs for fear that they will be denied health
insurance by future employers due to preexisting conditions. See Len M. Nichols & Linda
1. Blumberg, A Different Kind of 'New Federalism'? The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS 25,27 (1998).
238 A small-group market is defined as consisting of two to fifty employees. 42 U.S. C. §
300gg-91(e)(4), (5).
239 !d. § 300gg-11. More specifically, HIPAA provides that insurers offering group
insurance may not base rules of eligibility for enrollment on any of the following factors:
health status, physical or mental illness, claims experience, receipt of health care, medical
history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, and disability. !d. § 300gg-1(a).
240 !d. § 300gg-1(b).
241 !d. § 300gg-12.
242 !d. § 300gg-41. Individuals are eligible under the following conditions: 1) they have
had eighteen months of continuous prior coverage with no coverage gap lasting longer
than sixty-two days and have most recently had group coverage; 2) they have exhausted
any COBRA benefits available to them and have no current access to group insurance or
a public program; and 3) they are eligible for some type of guaranteed issue coverage in
the individual market. !d. § 300gg-41(b).
243
!d. § 300gg-42.
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person purchasing an individual policy. 244 The absence of
regulation in this area is significant. A recent study found a vast
range of annual premiums in the individual market extending from
$408 to $30,000, with an average of $2,998 per year for healthy
single people and $3,996 for those with medical problems. 245
IDP AA enhanced protection for health insurance
beneficiaries by reducing health insurers' ability to select risks.
However, it still allows them considerable discretion to engage in
risk classification. Insurers may charge different groups different
premiums in the group market, and individuals purchasing policies
in the individual market may also be charged vastly different rates.
In addition, the statute does not address limitations and exclusions
of coverage for particular treatments. The statute, therefore, does
not provide comprehensive protection to health insurance
consumers and allows insurers to exercise discretion in many
areas.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

Numerous federal anti-discrimination laws address the issue
of health insurance coverage. One would therefore assume that
they provide extensive and thorough protection against disability,
gender, and age discrimination in insurance practices. This,
however, is not the case. Several of the laws apply only to
employer-provided insurance benefits. 246 Some create significant
defenses for insurers, which allow them to justify disc1iminatory
benefit terms. 247 Thus, insurers can establish AIDS caps, can
refuse to cover hearing aids, can often drastically limit or exclude
coverage for mental health care,248 and can offer older employees
far less insurance coverage than that available to younger workers.
Moreover, none of the civil rights laws protect people on the basis
of economic status, which is often the most significant determinant
of the level of insurance obtainable by individuals. Consequently,
we have in the United States 42.6 million uninsured people who

244

Id. § 300gg-41(g)(1).
See Geri Aston, Individual Market Tough for Many Insurance Buyers, AM. MED.
NEWS, July 9, 2001, at 14.
246 These laws include Title Vll, the EPA, and the AD EA. See discussion supra Part II.
247 See, e.g., American with Disabilities Act§ SOl(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994); id §
4(f), 29 U.S. C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
248 See discussion of Mental Health Parity Act, supra Part I.B.3. The Act expired on
September 30, 2001. 42 U.S. C. § 300gg-S(f).
245
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are not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare coverage. 249 The federal
statutory scheme that is designed to combat discrimination is
fraught with large and troubling gaps in the arena of health
insurance.
Several approaches can be utilized to enhance protection for
insurance beneficiaries. First, additional federal statutes could be
passed to prohibit discriminatory insurance practices. Federal
regulation that requires increasingly extensive coverage while
leaving the private insurance system otherwise unchanged,
however, could ultimately harm rather than help the American
public.
With additional coverage requirements, insurance
companies would likely continue to raise premiums in order to
maintain profitability, malcing insurance unaffordable for many
individuals. Furthermore, ever-increasing insurance costs could
induce employers to stop providing health insurance to their
employees, because employers are not required by law to provide
insurance benefits. 250
Federal law is also often ambiguous with respect to its
applicability to health insurance. The statutes have generated
considerable litigation, which is costly for plaintiffs, defendants,
and taxpayers. 251 Inconsistent decisions issued by different courts
also may cause confusion for insurers seeking judicial guidance
concerning insurance terms. Federal anti-discrimination laws are
the product of extensive lobbying and political compromise.
Consequently, they often contain equivocal and imprecise
language, which is open to varying interpretations. 252
Finally, because legislation is often a response to public
pressure and political concern, it does not necessarily assist all
those in need. 253 Groups with strong lobbyists or prominent
249

See Aston, supra, note 245, at 14; see also Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank C. Ullman,
Health Insurance and Health Access, 22 J. LEG. MED. 247, 247 (2001). Other estimates
range from 42.1 million uninsured (in 1999) to 44 million uninsured (in 2000). See Steven
A. Schroeder, Prospects for Expanding Health Insurance Coverage, 344 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 847, 847 (2001); see also Stephen Blakely, The Economic Costs of the Uninsured,
EBRI NOTES, Aug. 2000, at 1. Over 80% of the uninsured are from families in which at
least one member is employed, and almost two thirds are under the age of 35. More than
half are in families whose incomes fall below 200% of the federal poverty level, that is, less
than $34,100 for a family of four. See Schroeder, supra, at 847.
250 See Lenhart, supra note 171, at 618 ("[E]mployers are not required to provide any
health coverage to their workers"); see also Blakely, supra note 249, at 1 ("Employers are
not legally required to provide coverage to their workers, and individuals are not legally
required to maintain coverage").
251 See cases discussed supra Parts I-II.
252 See SCALIA, supra note 92, at 34 (discussing the involvement of lobbyists in
Congressional floor debates).
253 See id.
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representatives might succeed in promulgating legislation that
benefits their special interest, while equally deserving groups may
fail because of much weaker lobbying abilities and less
prominence. 254
In the alternative, additional regulation of health insurance
coverage could be left to the states. Many states have in fact tried
to address specific problems of discrimination by mandating
coverage for particular treatments. Almost 1000 different state
mandates concerning health insurance coverage have been issued
by state legislatures. 255 State mandates, however, also provide only
a very partial solution.
First, state mandates will not protect patients enrolled in selffunded employee benefit plans 256 because under a federal law
called the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"), 257 state laws regulating insurance are preempted with
respect to self-funded plans and cannot be enforced. 258 This
exception is quite consequential because a growing number of
employers are self-insured.ZS9 In addition, state legislation, like
federal legislation, can lead to the problems of rising insurance
254 In 1998, for example, Congress enacted the Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act
of 1998. 29 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (Supp. 2001). The Act requires all group health plans and
health insurance issuers offering coverage for mastectomies to provide reimbursement for
reconstructive surgery that is associated with a mastectomy. Patients suffering from other
cancers, however, have not achieved the passage of legislation that addresses their specific
coverage issues. See id.
255 See United States General Accounting Office Report to the Honorable James M.
Jeffords, U.S. Senate, Health Insurance Regulation: Varying State Requirements Affect
Cost of Insurance GAO?HEHS-96-161 (1996), at 9 (noting that "(o]n average, states have
enacted laws mandating about 18 specific benefits"); New Study Shows 992 Mandated
Benefits in the States, MEo. BENEFITS, Sept. 30, 1991, at 6; Russell Korobkin, The
Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded
Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2 (1999) (citing Alain C.
Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in Regulating Managed Care,
HEALTH AFF. Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 26, 30).
256 Employers who choose self-funded plans pay their employees' medical claims on
their own rather than contracting with a commercial insurer that collects premiums and
serves as a third party payer. Every medical claim translates into an out-of-pocket
expense for these employers. They are therefore known as self-insured employers. See
Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECfiNG PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC
ERA 281, 293 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
257 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461.
258 See Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health
Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REv. 203,
41-243 (1999); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) ("We read the ...
(statute] to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulat[e] insurance."').
259 See Rothstein, supra note 256, at 293. In 1993, 93 percent of employers with more
than 40,000 employees were self-insured, as were 85 percent of employers with 5,00040,000 employees, and 37 percent of those with 50-199 employees. See id.

2002]

DISCRIMINATION & HEALTH INSURANCE

1361

costs, litigation due to ambiguous drafting, and piecemeal
responses to lobbying from powerful interest groups or to high
260
profil e cases.
A third approach is governmental intervention in the form of
a centralized, publicly accountable agency that would establish an
extensive, nationally binding health care coverage mandate. Many
other industries are already regulated by powerful administrative
agencies. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") regulates the aviation industry,261 the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") regulates activities that affect the
environment,Z62 and the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
regulates food and drug products.263 There is no reason why the
health insurance industry should not be subject to similar
governmental oversight.
Construction of a detailed model for such an agency is beyond
the scope of this paper. 264 However, it is important to emphasize
that the regulatory entity should make its decisions in light of
current scientific research, medical outcome data, and patient
preferences, with input from patients, physicians, researchers,
research sponsors, and insurers. Moreover, it should focus on the
global cost of the coverage requirements it designs in order to
create a benefits package that is responsive to both patient needs
and the reality of finite economic resources.
260

The point is illustrated clearly by an Assembly Insurance Committee
Statement regarding a New Jersey law that mandates reimbursement for the
treatment of Wilm's tumor by high dose chemotherapy and an autologous
bone marrow transplant. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6f note (West 1996)
(Assembly Insurance Committee Statement). It states in relevant part:
This bill has been referred to as the "Tishna Rollo Bill." Tishna Rollo is an
eight-year-old Glen Ridge girl who is battling Wilm's tumor, a rare form of
cancer which generally affects the kidneys before spreading to other parts of
the body. Recently, Tishna's case has received much attention because her
doctors have concluded that the transplants are the one chance they have to
cure her disease, yet her family's health insurer initially refused to provide
coverage for the treatment because it asserted that such treatment was not
covered in her health insurance contract as it is considered "experimental"
or "investigational." Court action on this issue is pending. This bill will
eliminate the controversy surrounding the treatment and, in effect, absolve
health insurers, and ultimately the courts, of the responsibility of making any
determination regarding this issue. Id.
See 49 U.S. C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
See 42 U.S. C. § 4321 (1994) (Reorganization plans, Section 1).
263 See 21 U.S. C. § 393 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
264
For further discussion see Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral
Faimess in Health Care Coverage (submitted for publication in the spring of 2002).
261
262
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Additional piecemeal federal and state legislation will not
effectively solve the problem of discrimination in health insurance
coverage. Without a national benefits package, we will continue to
have hearing impaired individuals who cannot afford hearing aids
and people with AIDS who cannot obtain needed treatment. It is
only with oversight and regulation by a centralized, publicly
accountable governmental agency that we can begin to tackle the
challenge of enhancing protection for health insurance
beneficiaries.

